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The Imaginary and Symbolic of Jacques Lacan 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
The principal categories of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the structuring of the 
psyche are the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. The imaginary (imagi-
naire) refers to perceived or imagined images in conscious and unconscious 
thought, sensible and intelligible forms; picture thinking (Vorstellung), 
dream images or manifest content, and conscious ego in discursive thought. 
The symbolic (symbolique) refers to the signifying order, signifiers, in lan-
guage, which determine the subject; it refers to the unconscious, and the in-
tellectual, the logos endiathetos and the logos prophorikos. It is the relation 
between the imaginary and symbolic in conscious and unconscious thought 
which is the core of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The real (réel) is that which is 
neither imaginary nor symbolic in conscious or unconscious thought, and 
which is inaccessible to psychoanalysis. It is only proposed as an algebraic 
concept, as it can not even be conceived, like the One of Plotinus, which 
cannot be thought or described, but which exists as an absence in the sym-
bolic order (language) in the same way that the unconscious exists as an ab-
sence in conscious thought. The real is as the umbilical cord of the Freudian 
unconscious, which Lacan reframes as constituted by the symbolic. 
      The imaginary and the symbolic, perception and language, are always in-
terwoven, but while they are always interwoven, the experience of the mirror 
stage also constitutes a fundamental disjunction between the two, which can 
never be overcome, and which causes a disjunction or gap within the subject, 
as it is constituted by the image and the word. At about eighteen months of 
age, after the initial acquisition of language, the infant first recognizes itself 
in the mirror in self-consciousness, thus distinguishing itself from its sur-
roundings. From the mirror stage, all perception is subsumed in language, as 
the imaginary is subsumed in the symbolic, and it is the perceived image 
which becomes the basis of conscious thought and ego, while language struc-
tures the unconscious, in the Lacanian scheme.      
      The ego is formed in the imaginary image of the self in the mirror stage 
prior to the development of the subject in relation to the Other, which is de-
fined by Lacan as the network of identifications which determine the subject 
in interpersonal relations, and which constitutes the unconscious. The image 
of the self formed by the mirror must be reconciled with the image of the self 
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formed in relation to language and other people, which is an impossible rec-
onciliation, and stages a dialectical process, related to the Hegelian dialectic 
between subjective and objective spirit, or reason and perception, but without 
resolution. Following the mirror stage, perception, “takes what is present to it 
as a universal” (Phenomenology of Spirit §111),1 in the words of Hegel. The 
act of perceiving is “the movement of pointing-out” in combination with the 
movement of the event of the object perceived, as in Zeno’s paradox. Percep-
tion is already a dialectic of the imaginary and symbolic, the image and the 
conceptual framework in which the image is perceived. In the movement 
from the subjective to objective spirit of Hegel, that which is perceived be-
comes identified with the conceptual process of the perceiving subject, which 
for Lacan is the identification of the imaginary and symbolic as ego-
formation and language. 
      The development of the child in the mirror stage is the passage from be-
havior based on object identifications which is not regulated by any kind of 
conscious logic to the insertion of the subject into the symbolic order, lan-
guage, where the object identifications are reconciled with conceptual struc-
tures. In the mirror stage, objects gain exteriority and alterity, and become 
invested with the self, the point of view of the subject, the subjective; begin-
ning with the mirror stage, all perceived objects are seen in relation to the 
body of the perceiver, which is seen for the first time as an entity differenti-
ated from its surroundings, as if taking on a kind of armor. The body of the 
perceiver is thus differentiated from all other bodies or objects in perception, 
and the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived is established. 
One goal in Lacan’s concept of the gaze, the real in perception, a gap or sco-
toma in perception which is the equivalent of a gap or scotoma in discursive 
reason, is the dialectical synthesis, or re-unification, of the perceiver and the 
perceived, which is a goal of the intellectual of Plotinus.  
      The differentiation between the perceiver and the perceived is cemented 
by language, or the symbolic order, which leads the subject to see itself as 
constructing what it perceives, and which absorbs the gestalt object identifi-
cation of the mirror stage and makes impossible the undifferentiated interior-
ity of the perceived object in the imaginary. Any state of being-in-self is 
absorbed by being-for-self. The differentiation is primarily manifest in the 
contrast between the unity of the image of the body in relation to perception 
and the multiplicity of perception itself. The unified body image as formed in 
the mirror stage does not conform to the experience of perception as estab-
lished in the imaginary, as multiple and differentiated, as a phenomenal flux 
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of forms, and it transforms it, in a conflicting manner, from perception to ap-
perception, from multiplicity to the manifold in the a priori intuition, in 
Kantian terms, which would be an attribute of the Lacanian symbolic.  
      The images of the imaginary, as experienced by the pre-mirror stage in-
fant, are not subject to a hierarchy or dependent on a particular point of view. 
They are “visible without their visibility being the result of the act of any 
particular observer, to be, as it were, always already seen,”2 in the words of 
Fredric Jameson in The Ideology of Theory. The images are independent of 
thought as pure perception, but such pure perception cannot be conceptual-
ized, because it is prior to thought. It is thus immediately an archê, an origi-
nary state prior to differentiation. In that way the real can be seen to be 
contained in the imaginary, while conditioned by the symbolic. Differentia-
tion occurs in the object identification of the mirror stage, in a gestalt projec-
tion of the self. Objects in the sense experience prior to the mirror stage lack 
the exteriority of specular or symbolic objects; they are only singular, and 
have no relation to other objects, as in apperception, which is established in 
the categories of a priori intuition in the manifold, such as space and time, in 
the Kantian scheme, and through mathematics and geometry in relation to 
intelligibles in the intellectual in the Plotinian scheme. The perceived objects 
are not doubled, so they do not contain alterity or differentiation, which are 
products of the conceptual order of the symbolic.  
      The new image of perception in the mirror stage results in the projection 
of the self into that which is perceived, that is, the ego, which is found in the 
dream image and fantasy, phantasm, or hallucination as well. As a result of 
that projection, the subject is also self-perceived as fragmented in relation to 
the body image, or the opposite of that which is formed by the mirror stage; 
the self-perception of the fragmentation of the subject is the result of the in-
sertion of the subject into the symbolic, and the conflicts arising between the 
imaginary and symbolic. In the symbolic, the subject sees its gestalt image, 
its ego, as a defense against that fragmentation, and thus the differentiation 
between the perceiver and perceived is preserved. The conscious ego in per-
ception is a defense against the fragmentation and alienantion of the subject 
in the symbolic. According to Lacan in Écrits, “the mirror stage is a drama 
whose internal dynamic shifts from insufficiency to anticipation—a drama 
that, for its subject, caught in the mirage of spatial identification, vehiculates 
a whole series of fantasies which range from a fragmented image of the body 
to what we will term an orthopedic form of its unity, and to that ultimate as-
sumption of the armature of an alienating identity [ego], whose rigid struc-
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ture will mark the subject’s entire mental development.”3 The interiority of 
the object in perception is no longer reconcilable with the exteriority of the 
object, as the interiority of the subject is no longer reconcilable with the exte-
riority of the specular image. “Thus the rupture of the circle in which Innen-
welt and Umwelt are united generates that inexhaustible attempt to square it 
in which we reap the ego” (Écrits, p. 97), which is the Lacanian dialectic. 
      The division of the object from itself is the division of the subject from 
itself, a subject which reinforces its identity in the symbolic (language) by 
perpetuating its identity with the other (object) by which it is objectified in 
the symbolic. The symbolic order, language, constitutes a self-alienation of 
the subject in the disjunction between the perceiver and the perceived, and in 
the disjunction between the ego of the subject, formed in the specular image, 
and the experience of perception. Such self-alienation re-introduces the He-
gelian conception of the self-alienation of reason in consciousness into the 
definition of language in the formation of the subject from structural linguis-
tics. In the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel, “desire and the self-certainty 
obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty 
comes from superseding this other: in order that the supersession take place, 
there must be this other” (175). The self-certainty of reason, the ego, comes 
from its identification with the object in perception, as a result of mirror-
stage development, as the subject forms itself in the imaginary order. The 
other to the existence of the subject is the absence of the object in perception, 
thus the absence of reason, language and perception. The subject defines it-
self in the perception of an object. It is not possible for reason to exist to it-
self in consciousness without the perceived presence of non-reason, because 
of the complicity of the imaginary and symbolic.  
      According to Johann Gottlieb Fichte in The Science of Knowledge, “the 
self posits itself as determined by the not-self.”4 This can be seen to occur in 
mirror-stage development, in the disjunction between experience and identi-
ty, and is solidified in language. According to Hegel, in that reason in per-
ception is given to self-consciousness as a double negative, the negation of a 
negation, as for Lacan, reason in self-consciousness cannot overcome the 
other; the symbolic subject in language cannot overcome the imaginary sub-
ject in its identification in language. The self-alienation of reason in being 
continually reproduces the other, the imaginary, in that it might be overcome 
by reason. The continuous process of reproduction is desire. As reason re-
turns to itself from the other in the dialectic, it discovers itself as simultane-
ously “absolute negativity” and “infinite self-affirmation,” as described by 
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Hegel. Reason (symbolic) is seen as the self-affirmation of absolute negativi-
ty (imaginary), the perpetuation of the externality of language in the void of 
being which language creates, which is given by the mirror-stage transfor-
mation in object identification after the acquisition of language, and which is 
given by both the arbitrary nature of the relation between signifier and signi-
fied in language in structural linguistics, and the resistance of the signified to 
the signifier in the science of the letter of Lacan. 
      According to Lacan in Seminar I (Freud’s Papers on Technique), “if we 
must define that moment in which man becomes human, we would say that it 
is at that instant when, as minimally as you like, he enters into a symbolic 
relationship.”5 The subject is formed when language is gained, and the sub-
ject is defined in the beginning as self-alienation, the self-alienation of rea-
son as given by language. The subject is defined by the imaginary, how he or 
she perceives the world, and the imaginary is absorbed into the constitution 
of the subject, as the other of reason in language. The imaginary, conscious 
language and perception, is seen as a kind of lost synthesis, or lost totality, 
which is the object of desire in reason to rediscover, as formulated by Hegel. 
The disjunction or self-alienation of the subject is preserved in discursive 
reason and language, and the conscious ego. The subject is divided when it 
enters into language in the form of a representative pronoun. As in any sign, 
the signifier, the imaginary subject, the ego of the subject, resists the signi-
fied, the symbolic subject, the unconscious of the subject, from crossing the 
bar of signification.  
      The signifier “I,” ego, das Ich, becomes representative of or a substitute 
for the subject, while the subject disappears under the bar. The subject be-
comes a signifier to other signifiers. The substitutive nature of the signifier is 
reinforced by its participation in the signifying chain. The subject is excluded 
from the signifying chain at that point that it is represented in it, as the signi-
fier represents the subject for another signifier. The subject is thus divided in 
language, and is represented by its own absence, which is the elided signi-
fied, which is the presence of the unconscious. The subject is defined by lan-
guage, which at the same time assures its non-being, thus resulting in the 
Hegelian dialectic of desire in reason. The presence of the unconscious as 
absence in conscious thought is also given by language, and so for Lacan the 
unconscious is constituted by language as well. The distinction between la 
langue and parole is the distinction between the unconscious and conscious 
subject, and the structure of its division. The unconscious appears through 
the primary repression of language.  
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      As the subject is inserted into language, it is inserted into the Other, 
which is the shared system of laws, customs, beliefs, etc. which language 
produces, as in the objective of Hegel, and which further alienates the subject 
from itself, as that which is both produced by those laws and excluded from 
them. If the unconscious is structured by language, according to Lacan, then 
the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, as la langue of language, the 
underlying matrix of expression. The subject is subverted in its subordination 
to the signifier in language, which is a function of the Other, which is the 
discourse of the unconscious. It is the unconscious, as absence in the signify-
ing chain of language, to which the subject is subverted, the subject as it is 
known to itself as represented in language. 
      The concept of the Other was inherited by Lacan from the structural an-
thropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who saw society as “an ensemble of 
symbolic systems, in the first rank of which would be language, marriage-
rules, economic relations, art, science, religion,”6 placing importance on in-
terpersonal relations in the definition of the subject in society. Lévi-Strauss 
concluded that “symbols are more real than what they symbolize” and “the 
signifier precedes and determines the signified” (“Introduction à l’Oeuvre de 
Marcel Mauss” in Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie, p. xxxii); so-
cial life, and therefore the subject, are determined by a system of rules, 
namely the social signifiers. The theory of Lévi-Stauss’ corresponds to the 
structural linguistics of Saussure in that, Lévi-Strauss explained in Totemism 
(Le Totémisme aujord’hui, 1962) that “systems do not consist of a sequence 
of one-to-one relations between terms (human groups and natural species), 
but rather of two parallel series of differences between terms,” in the words 
of Peter Dews in Logics of Disintegration (p. 75). 
      The Other (language, law, systems of rules) assumes predominance over 
nature and instinct in human behavior. Lacan reflected the position of Lévi-
Strauss when he wrote in “The function and field of speech and language in 
psychoanalysis” in Écrits: “The primordial Law is therefore that which in 
regulating marriage ties superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a na-
ture abandoned to the law of mating.…This law, then, is clearly revealed as 
identical with an order of language.”7 The primordial law is no longer a myth 
of origin, but language itself. For Lacan, though, the symbolic order is ulti-
mately irreducible to human experience; the subject is found to be alienated 
within it, while it is being caused by it. The human being is left with no sub-
jectivity, in the inaccessibility of the linguistic order of the Other in uncon-
scious thought. In Seminar II (The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
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Techniques of Psychoanalysis), Lacan described language as “constituted in 
such a way as to found us in the Other, while radically preventing us from 
understanding him.”8 
      The so-called L-schema of Lacan is a diagram which represents the re-
sulting quadrature of the subject: the ego, the unconscious subject, the Other, 
and the other (as in the other person, or object in perception). The relation 
between the subject as ego and the other is an imaginary relation in con-
scious perception, a relation of unmediated identification in conscious desire, 
but that relation, in the quadrature of the subject, is determined by the rela-
tion between the unconscious subject and the Other, or language. In a pro-
found way, individual conscious activity is shown to be determined by 
predetermined unconscious activity, and the subject is shown to be a product 
of language. The desiring relation of the ego to the other is seen as parole, or 
enunciation, individual speech in language, which is propelled by the ego as 
representative of the subject in language, in the use of the pronoun as signifi-
er. Parole is intersected by la langue in language in the same way that the 
conscious desire of the speaking subject as ego is intersected by the dis-
course of the Other in the unconscious. 
      The ego projects itself onto the other in desire, and it seeks a reinforce-
ment of itself in a response from the other. In Écrits, the “subject always im-
poses on the other in the radical diversity of modes of relation, which range 
from the invocation of speech to the most immediate sympathy, an imaginary 
form which bears the seal, or the superimposed seals, of the experiences of 
powerlessness through which this form was modeled in the subject: and this 
form is nothing other than the ego.”9 Beyond the identification of the projec-
tion of the ego as representative of the subject in language, it is impossible to 
know what the significance of the desire of the ego for the other is for the 
subject, or for any definition of human behavior. The ego is an imaginary 
ego, the product of the specular image of the body, but the imaginary has 
been subsumed by the symbolic, by the reformulation and Spaltung of the 
subject through insertion in the mirror experience and the symbolic order.  
      The resistance of the ego to the unconscious is the resistance of the signi-
fied to the signifier in language. It is also impossible for the ego to know 
what the other is, because the other is already constituted by the symbolic. A 
relation between two individuals is predicated on the impossibility of them 
knowing each other in terms other than how they are constituted in the Other. 
Relationships are mutual reinforcements of egos, reinforcements of the rep-
resentation by the subject of itself in language, a representation which is false 
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and misleading in relation to the full constitution of the individual. In that 
perspective, relationships between individuals are based on dissimulation, 
concealment, deceit, and individuals are separated from each other by the 
wall of language, by their mutual méconnaissance. 
      In Seminar II of Lacan, the reality of the subject is thus not in the ego, 
but in the unconscious, and “in the unconscious, excluded from the system of 
the ego, the subject speaks.”10 The reality of the subject in the unconscious 
exceeds the reality of the subject as ego in conscious thought. As Lacan ex-
plained, “If this I,” or ego, “is in fact presented to us as a kind of immediate 
given in the act of reflection by which consciousness grasps itself as trans-
parent to itself,” which was the case for Hegel, and even for Freud, “for all 
that, nothing indicates that the whole of this reality…would be exhausted by 
this” (Seminar II, p. 6). The reality beyond language in conscious thought is 
given by the absences in language, the holes or scotomata, which reveal the 
existence of language as a comprehensive system of knowledge, a manifold 
reflecting the manifold of perception, to be a mirage. Language appears to be 
so by necessity, otherwise it could not function as representation.  
      Language is complicit with both consciousness and perception in its rep-
resentation of the subject as ego, in its totality as that which is represented by 
language. As Lacan expressed in “Agressivity and Psychoanalysis” in Écrits, 
the “theoretical difficulties encountered by Freud seem to me in fact to de-
rive from the mirage of objectification, inherited from classical psychology 
constituted by the idea of the perception/consciousness system,” in which 
“Freud seems suddenly to fail to recognize the existence of everything that 
the ego neglects, scotomizes, misconstrues in the sensations that make it re-
act to reality, everything that it ignores, exhausts, and binds in the significa-
tions that it receives from language…” (Ecrits, A Selection, p. 22). This is “a 
surprising méconnaissance [misconstruction] on the part of the man who 
succeeded by the power of his dialectic in forcing back the limits of the un-
conscious.” The méconnaissance is surprising to Lacan because it is Freud 
himself who drew attention to those misconstructions and scotomata, in the 
form of jokes, puns, glossolalia, neologisms, slips of the tongue, etc. 
      Lacan described the constitution of the ego in language in the essay “The 
subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian uncon-
scious,” in Écrits. The diachronic differentiation of signifiers, the glissement 
in the signifying chain in language, the “vector of enunciation,” is intersected 
by the relation between the elided subject in signification, the signified, and 
the ego ideal, or the identification of the ego with the Other. This relation is 
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predicated by the Other, the network of signifiers in which the subject is able 
to form an identity. The point at which the elided subject is identified is the 
point at which the line of the relation between elided subject and ego ideal is 
intersected by the vector of enunciation, which occurs retroactively in the 
signifying chain, in anticipation of signification. “The diachronic function of 
this anchoring point is to be found in the sentence, even if the sentence com-
pletes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in 
the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its ret-
roactive effect” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 303). 
      The anchoring point of Lacan is the point de capiton, in the metaphoric 
chain, the point at which the bar between the signifier and signified is 
crossed. The vector of the relation between the subject and the other is an 
imaginary vector in the L-schema, a vector rooted in conscious perception, in 
image identification, so the crossing of the bar, which is a mythical crossing, 
occurs along the imaginary vector. Every act of speech must be supported by 
a self-conception of the subject in the insertion of the subject into language 
as ego ideal in the symbolic, but the conception of the subject can never be 
realized; it is always an expectation, and the subject can only identify itself 
after the fact of enunciation. “This is a retroversion effect by which the sub-
ject becomes at each stage what he was before and announces himself—he 
will have been—only in the future perfect tense,” according to Lacan (Écrits, 
A Selection, p. 306).  
      This makes it impossible for the subject to recognize itself in language as 
other than ideal ego, because the subject is in part the elided subject in the 
glissement of signifiers, and only occurs as absence after the fact. As Lacan 
explained, “At this point the ambiguity of a failure to recognize [méconnais-
sance] that is essential to knowing myself (un méconnaître essentiel au me 
connaître) is introduced. For, in this ‘rear view’ (rétrovisée), all that the sub-
ject can be certain of is the anticipated image coming to meet him that he 
catches of himself in his mirror,” the imaginary vector between the subject 
and the other, the object of perception, which announces the absence of the 
subject in language, in crossing the bar between signifier and signified, but 
bars the subject from its own absence (the unconscious), in not being able to 
cross the bar at the same time, as in metaphor.  
      In the absence of the elided subject in language and the barring of it to 
itself, “it should be noted that a clue may be found in the clear alienation that 
leaves to the subject the favor of stumbling upon the question of its essence 
[unconscious, subjective], in that he cannot fail to recognize that what he de-
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sires,” in the vector of enunciation, along which the desire of the ego for the 
other flows, “presents itself to him as what he does not want, the form as-
sumed by the negation in which the méconnaissance of which he himself is 
unaware is inserted in a very strange way—a méconnaissance by which he 
transfers the permanence of his desire to an ego that is nevertheless intermit-
tent, and, inversely, protects himself from his desire by attributing to it these 
very intermittences.” The vector of enunciation intersects with the vector of 
the relation between the subject and the Other, and the result is that in the 
glissement the elided subject cannot be present except at the one moment of 
retroactive presence which is connected to the imaginary, so that otherwise 
the elided subject can only be represented in the signifier as ego, intermit-
tently in the diachronic process of the signifying chain, and the intermittence 
itself guarantees the perpetual absence of the elided subject.  
      The ego of Lacan is formed as a necessary replacement for the elided 
subject in the structure of language. “Thus the founding drama of the ego…is 
repeated in miniature as the imaginary dimension of every act of enuncia-
tion” (Logics of Disintegration, p. 99), in the words of Peter Dews. The sub-
ject is divided in language, between conscious and unconscious, signifier and 
signified, imaginary ego and symbolic, and the result is “the moment of a 
‘fading’ or eclipse of the subject that is closely bound up with the Spaltung 
or splitting that it suffers from its subordination to the signifier,” as described 
by Lacan (Écrits, A Selection, p. 313). The subject cannot be adequately rep-
resented by signifiers in language; non-being cannot be adequately repre-
sented by being. It is only in the gap between signifiers, the hole, that the 
subject is revealed. “It follows that the place of the ‘inter-said’ (inter-dit), 
which is the ‘intra-said’ (intra-dit) of a between-two-subjects, is the very 
place in which the transparency of the classical subject is divided and passes 
through the effects of ‘fading’ that specify the Freudian subject by its occul-
tation by an even purer signifier…” (p. 299).  
      The unconscious is found in the space between two subjects, in the space 
between two signifiers. It is in the gap that the mirage of the ego is revealed 
as representation, and the unconscious comes forward in the non-being of the 
subject in representation. The structure of the subject is one of discontinuity; 
the subject is never always present in language as being, and never always 
present as non-being. Absence and presence come and go in the glissement 
of signifiers in language; they are interwoven in an irresoluble dialectic. Ab-
sence is made present in the gaps and scotomata, and “these effects lead us to 
the frontiers at which slips of the tongue and witticisms, in their collusion, 
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become confused, even where elision is so much the more allusive in track-
ing down presence to its lair….” Freud did not conceive of this relation of 
the ego to the unconscious in language because he did not have the benefit of 
structural linguistics, the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakob-
son, according to Lacan. “‘Geneva 1910’ and ‘Petrograd 1920’ suffice to ex-
plain why Freud lacked this particular tool” (p. 298). Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is predicated on the correspondence between the Freudian 
unconscious and the concept of the signifier in structural linguistics, a corre-
spondence which corrects a “defect of history” in the progress of the science 
of the letter. “But this defect of history makes all the more instructive the fact 
that the mechanisms described by Freud which are those of ‘the primary pro-
cess’, in which the unconscious assumes its role, correspond exactly to the 
functions that this school believes determines the most radical aspects of the 
effects of language, namely metaphor and metonymy,” that is, “the signifi-
er’s effects of substitution and combination on the respectively synchronic 
and diachronic dimensions in which they appear in discourse.” 
      The imaginary ideal ego, as opposed to the symbolic ego ideal, is a prod-
uct of the mirror stage, formed from the image which the infant sees in the 
mirror, and object identification in perception. The ideal ego is an imaginary 
ego (moi) as opposed to the symbolic ego of the speaking subject (je) in lan-
guage. The ego ideal is a subjective ego “before it is objectified in the dialec-
tic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it in the 
universal [the concept], its function as subject” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 2), as 
Lacan described in “The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as 
revealed in psychoanalytic experience.” The objectification of the subject in 
language, in the universal, is the Hegelian transition from the subjective to 
the objective, which is enacted through perception.  
      Perception, or apperception, is differentiated from sense-certainty by He-
gel in that perception “takes what is present to it as a universal” (Phenome-
nology of Spirit, 111). The specular image of the infant is already taken as a 
universal, because the infant has the the use of language, so the image is of 
the subjective subject, as defined by its interiority, as opposed to the objec-
tive subject, as defined by its exteriority, its representation in language be-
tween signifiers. For Hegel, the differentiated particulars given by perception 
in discursive reason, which are products of the dialectic between the univer-
sal and particular, symbolic and imaginary, are an “essence-less by-play” 
(687) of self-conscious spirit, the subjective ego ideal, in the same way that 
for Lacan the participation of the ego in language, as representative of the 
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subject, is an essence-less by-play in the play of differences in the signifying 
chain. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (687), “the determinations of this sub-
stance are only attributes which do not obtain to self-subsistence” in the 
same way that the ego as subject in language is an attribute which cannot 
prevent the disappearance of the subject.  
      The variable forms of appearance in sense perception are for Hegel inde-
terminate and insubstantial, adornments of reality, as in the luminous em-
broidered veil of Plato in the Republic (514), the curtain-wall hanging next to 
the cave separating the prisoners from a burning fire, which acts as a veil be-
tween the finite and the infinite, between the sensible and the intelligible, or 
for Hegel, between the particular and universal, and for Lacan, between the 
imaginary and symbolic. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the proliferation of 
differentiated forms, vanishing shapes in perception, is the “reeling, uncon-
strained life” (Phenomenology of Spirit, 688) of being-for-self, objective 
spirit, as it would be for ego, signifier, in language. The being-for-self of ob-
jects in perception as solidified in the universal, in language, is the negative 
antithesis of the consciousness of spirit, or the interiority of the symbolic ego 
ideal. Through language, according to Hegel, spirit descends into externality, 
as for Lacan the imaginary subject becomes the objectified subject of the 
symbolic. Hegel described the objectified subject as ego in language and 
perception as nothing other than the self-confirmation of reason in its nega-
tion of the other, what is other to it; it is for Lacan the self-confirmation of 
conscious thought in its negation of the other, what is other to it, its doubling 
in representation, which is the unconscious, as given by language. 
      The imaginary ideal ego (Ideal-I, Ideal-Ich, je-idéal) is a form which 
“situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional 
direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone,” ac-
cording to Lacan (Écrits, A Selection, p. 2). It will “only rejoin the coming-
into-being (le dévenir) of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of 
the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his discordance with 
his own reality.” When the subject is subsumed into language the imaginary 
ego becomes inaccessible and difficult to discern, except in glimpses, which 
approach the unconscious in language, as presence in absence, but cannot ac-
cede to it, like the polygonal figures in relation to the circle in the negative 
theology of Nicolas Cusanus. 
      The specular image of the infant is in contrast to prior sense experience 
already, before it is conceptualized in the symbolic, which constitutes an or-
ganic discord in the infant as well as an inorganic one. The form of the body 
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is fixed in the mirror by the infant “in contrast with the turbulent movements 
that the subject feels are animating him,” movements in experience which 
are precluded by the structure of language. The subjective, imaginary state 
has none of the completion and inclusiveness of the objective symbolic state 
of the subject; it is ambiguous, self-contradictory, given to a logic other than 
that of conscious reason, in the otherness of reason to itself in perception. As 
Freud showed, the imaginary plays a role in the formation of dream images, 
but as Lacan pointed out, the symbolic is always present in dreams, as a 
product of the immersion of the subject in the Other. Traces of the imaginary 
ideal ego are present in dream forms. 
      The organic discord in the infant is a sign of an “organic insufficiency in 
his natural reality” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 4), as described by Lacan, as the 
concept of nature is given in the symbolic. The relation of the subject to na-
ture is, as a result of the self-consciousness brought about by the specular 
identification, “altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a 
primordial discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor un-
coordination of the neo-natal months.” Many organic forms in nature, nuts 
for example, or pods or anthers (the pollen sac in the stamen in a flower; the 
release of the pollen, the male sex cells of the flower, is connected with the 
blooming of the flower [anthêros]), have seams built into them to allow for a 
natural dehiscence, or splitting apart. The formation of the subject is pro-
foundly influence by the primordial dehiscence, and its effect is principally 
seen in the mirror stage, where, “caught up in the lure of spatial identifica-
tion, the succession of fantasies that extends from a fragmented body image” 
is transformed into a “totality that I shall call orthopedic,” which assumes the 
role of the “armor of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject’s entire mental development.” 
      Lacan saw the strategy of the quadrature of the subject as a way of break-
ing out of the fixing of an alienating identity. The alienating identity is sus-
tained by the formation of the ego as signifier in language; the gestalt body 
image perceived in the mirror stage is the visual equivalent of the ego in lan-
guage, although that has not been formulated yet, but its formulation devel-
ops from the specular image identification, the fixing of a point of view in 
the visual experience, a fixed point of reference, as well as a totalizing and 
inclusive body image of the self, in the imaginary as a product of the symbol-
ic. The quadrature of the subject is also a means of breaking out of the Hege-
lian dialectic of the subjective and objective, “the circle of the Innenwelt into 
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the Umwelt,” given the introduction of the study of the tropic mechanisms of 
language, and the rules of structural linguistics. 
      The formation of the I, the imaginary ego, is symbolized in dreams by a 
fortress or a stadium, representing its alienating armor. The fortress protects 
against natural instincts, which threaten the mechanisms of the desire of the 
subject as constituted by the formation of the ego in language in relation to 
the other. The subject is constituted by a struggle between the organic and 
the inorganic. It is the natural instinct of all life to return to the inorganic, ac-
cording to Wilhelm Worringer, and so the artificial self-construction of the 
subject in language can be seen as a natural instinct of reason to resist in-
stinct and seek the inorganic. According to Worringer in Abstraction and 
Empathy, “the morphological law of inorganic nature still echoes like a dim 
memory in our human organism…every differentiation of organized matter, 
every development of its most primitive form, is accompanied by a tension, 
by a longing to revert to this most primitive form.”11 This is manifest in the 
process of abstraction in reason, and in geometrical abstraction in the visual 
arts. “The urge to abstraction finds its beauty in the life-denying inorganic, in 
the crystalline or, in general terms, in all abstract law and necessity” (Ab-
straction and Empathy, p. 4). The geometrical form is seen as the “morpho-
logical law of crystalline-inorganic matter” (p. 34).  
      For Sigmund Freud, “the aim of all life is death,” a reversion to a prior 
state of inorganic matter. Consciousness itself is seen as a form of life in the 
psyche which arose from a prior state and which contains an instinct of self-
negation. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the “attributes of life were at 
some time evoked in inanimate matter by the action of a force of whose na-
ture we can form no conception,” according to Freud. “It may perhaps have 
been a process similar in type to that which later caused the development of 
consciousness in a particular stratum of living matter. The tension which 
then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate substance endeavored to 
cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct came into being: the instinct to 
return to the inanimate state.”12 
      As Lacan put it, “to the Urbild of this formation, alienating as it is by vir-
tue of its capacity to render extraneous, corresponds a peculiar satisfaction 
deriving from the integration of an original organic disarray, a satisfaction 
that must be conceived in the dimension of a vital dehiscence that is constitu-
tive of man…” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 21). There is a desire in reason to pre-
serve the dehiscence, to preserve the impossibility of the reconciliation of the 
organic and inorganic, the imaginary and symbolic, in the desire for the inor-
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ganic. Such a desire in reason “makes unthinkable the idea of an environ-
ment that is preformed for him, a ‘negative’ libido that enables the Heraclite-
an notion of discord, which the Ephesian believed to be prior to harmony, to 
shine once more.” Reason preserves the disjunction between the Innenwelt 
and Umwelt, the imaginary and the symbolic (the preformed environment), 
which is characterized by fragmentation, disruption, ambiguity, and the im-
possibility of inclusiveness. 
      It is not by the function of the perception-consciousness system that the 
ego is formed in the imaginary, by the function of the self-consciousness of 
the infant in the mirror stage as a product of perception, but by the function 
of méconnaissance, and the function of the mirage of consciousness, which 
is given by perception in the imaginary, the self-certainty of the Cartesian 
cogito. The self-certainty of consciousness in the cogito prevents the subject 
from seeing itself as other than the objectified ego in language, and so “this 
‘I’ who, in order to admit its facticity to existential criticism, opposes its ir-
reducible inertia of pretences and méconnaissances to the concrete problem-
atic of the realization of the subject…” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 15), as Lacan 
put it. Such is necessary for the subject to function in the Other, in society as 
seen as the symbolic order. The presence of the unconscious is kept as an ab-
sence by reason in language and perception. 
      In its self-definition the imaginary ego is self-alienating, as inherited 
from the ideal ego of the mirror stage, where the specular image immediately 
presents an other to the self, as the self which is not the self, and the part of 
the self which is absent from the self. This experience is objectified, as de-
scribed, in language, and defines the formation of the ego in language, and 
the relation between the subject and the other. The form of the specular im-
age in the mirror stage “will crystallize in the subject’s internal conflictual 
tension, which determines the awakening of his desire for the object of the 
other’s desire…” (p. 19). The desire of the other, as seen in the L-schema, 
the quadrature of the subject, is the result of the identification of the imagi-
nary ego with the other, the search for self-reinforcement, self-reification in 
the presence of non-being, in intersection between the unconscious subject 
and the Other, an intersection which crystallizes the imaginary disjunction 
between the subject and the double of the subject in the mirror, the primordi-
al dehiscence between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt which the L-schema is 
designed to reveal and contextualize. 
     Lacan applied Freud’s dream analysis to the structuring of the uncon-
scious in linguistic terms in the “Rome Discourse” of 1953, “The Function of 
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Language in Psychoanalysis.” He announced: “Take up the work of Freud 
again at the Traumdeutung [Interpretation of Dreams] to remind yourself 
that the dream has the structure of a sentence or, rather, to stick to the letter 
of the work, of a rebus,” or in other words, “it has the structure of a form of 
writing, of which the child’s dream represents the primordial ideography and 
which, in the adult, reproduces the simultaneously phonetic and symbolic use 
of signifying elements, which can also be found in the hieroglyphics of an-
cient Egypt and in the characters still used in China.”13 The symbolic func-
tion of the signifying elements is of less importance than the linguistic 
mechanisms with which the dream is written, the phonetic elements.  
      The phonetic elements constitute the role of the symbolic in the uncon-
scious, as opposed to the imaginary, but of course depend on the role of the 
imaginary. Lacan explained, “But even this is no more than the deciphering 
of the instrument. The important part begins with the translation of the text, 
the important part which Freud tells us is given in the [verbal] elaboration of 
the dream,” which is a function of conscious reason, “in other words, in its 
rhetoric. Ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repeti-
tion, apposition—these are the syntactical displacements,” along with “meta-
phor, catachresis, antonomasis, allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche—these 
are the semantic condensations in which Freud teaches us to read the inten-
tions—ostentatious or demonstrative, dissimulating or persuasive, retaliatory 
or seductive—out of which the subject modulates his onieric discourse” (The 
Language of the Self, p. 31). Several of these linguistic mechanisms operate 
in the formation of dream images. In that these are the mechanisms which 
allow the subject to moderate the dream discourse, they are not mechanisms 
of the dream itself, but rather the conscious reading of the dream. 
      The absence of the subject in language follows the objectification of the 
ideal ego in the insertion of the subject in language along with mirror stage 
identification. The subject “becomes objectified in the dialectic of the identi-
fication with the other” (p. 45), according to Lacan, as spirit does for Hegel 
in objective spirit. The subject becomes a function of the universal, of con-
cept in language, as it does for Hegel in the movement from the particular to 
the universal. The ideal ego in the imaginary becomes inaccessible to the 
subject in language. The relation between the subject in language, the sym-
bolic, and the ideal ego, the imaginary, is an asymptotic one. The “wall of 
language” becomes a barrier to the self-identification of the subject, as it is to 
the realization of the subject for Hegel, the synthesis of the dialectic of ob-
jective and subjective in absolute spirit. 
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      The subject is doubled and self-alienated in the imaginary of Lacan, as 
the subject is doubled and self-alienated in discursive reason in the Phenom-
enology of Spirit of Hegel. The premise of the doubling of the subject in rea-
son, language and perception, is the dialectic of self-consciousness, the 
elision of the particular in the universal, but in the insertion in the Other the 
Lacanian subject is decentered from consciousness, that in which the subject 
identifies itself in the cogito. In the imaginary the self-identification of the 
subject is defined by méconnaissance rather than consciousness. The imagi-
nary is “an order which can only be ex-centric in relation to any bringing to 
realization of the consciousness-of-self,”14 according to Lacan. The dialectic 
of consciousness itself becomes other to the subject as it is defined in the im-
aginary, which precludes the possibility of a dialectical synthesis, a totality, 
however much it may be presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit as con-
taining its own negation. The subject can only be seen as divided. 
      For Hegel the division or alienation of the subject is synonymous with its 
formation. It is through the alienation (Entfremdung) of reason to itself that 
the subject discovers itself in its own dehiscence. In the Hegelian subject, ex-
istence (being-for-self) is set against nothingness (being-in-itself), which is 
not present in existence, or reality as given by language, as the being-in-itself 
of the Lacanian subject is not present in language. Being-in-itself, subjective 
spirit, is synthesized into the dialectic of reason, and in that way it becomes 
other to itself as fragmented being. As reason returns to itself from the other 
in the dialectic, it discovers itself simultaneously as “absolute negativity” and 
“infinite self-affirmation,” as described by Hegel in the Philosophy of Mind 
(§ 381).15 Reason is the perpetual self-affirmation of absolute negativity, the 
perpetuation of the externality of language in relation to the subject, the oth-
erness of the subject in relation to the imaginary order of Lacan.  
      In the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel, the “absolute certitude of self 
changes therefore immediately for it as consciousness into a dying echo, in 
the objectivity of its being-for-itself; but the world thus created is its dis-
course which it has heard similarly non-immediately and whose echo keeps 
on coming back to it….”16 The echo is subjective spirit, which can be seen as 
the unconscious, the absence which is present in the discourse, in language. 
Discourse, objective spirit, is seen as something which is always already in 
relation to the subject, which is other to it. The subject is present in discourse 
only as a non-presence; consciousness is only given by that which is other to 
it, which becomes the unconscious in the science of the letter. In the Rome 
Discourse, Lacan observed: “I identify myself in Language, but only by los-
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ing myself in it like an object” (The Language of the Self, p. 63), the being-
for-self of objective spirit. “What is realized in my history is not the past def-
inite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has 
been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I 
am in the process of becoming.” Memory (related to perception in the imagi-
nary) cannot establish presence in language. The present perfect of the sub-
ject, as a completion, is impossible in language. The subject is objectified in 
language as that which is in the process of becoming but has not yet become, 
which is nothing, non-being, as the signifier represents the subject to the next 
signifier in the chain of signification. The presence of the subject in language 
is presence as motion in the paradox of Zeno, the gap between the positions 
of the objects, as the gap between the signifiers, which always defines a par-
ticular place as it is translated into a universal concept, reason in language. 
      Freud translated the self-negation of reason in Hegel as a symptom of 
unconscious repression. In the essay “Negation” of 1925, the “content of a 
repressed presentation or thought can thus make its way through to con-
sciousness on the condition that it lets itself be negated. The Verneinung,” 
denial, “is a way to take cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already 
a ‘lifting and conserving’ of the repression, but not for all that an acceptance 
of what is repressed.”17 The Freudian unconscious is thus seen as being pre-
sent in the Hegelian dialectic, in the form of repression as a symptom of self-
negation, which is given by the insertion of the subject in the imaginary or-
der, and the loss of the other to reason, the unconscious, in the objectification 
of reason, and the loss of the symbolic subject, the presence of the uncon-
scious, in language and perception. 
      The imaginary becomes primary because it makes the ordering of reality 
possible in the entrance of the subject into language. An example of this is 
the Fort! Da! game described by Freud, the gone/here game enacted by the 
infant to compensate for the temporary departure of the mother. Freud ex-
plains in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “the interpretation of the game then 
became obvious. It was related to the child’s great cultural achievement—the 
instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) 
which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He 
compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappear-
ance and return of the objects within his reach” (p. 14).18 In the game, lan-
guage, the ordering of reality in the imaginary, as the unconscious is the 
ordering of reality of conscious experience, becomes a substitution for the 
instinctual displeasure which the infant feels at the departure of its mother, as 
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well as the instinctual joy which the infant feels upon her return, or the antic-
ipation of that joy. The departure of the mother is enacted in anticipation of 
the return in order to simulate the instinctual feeling in language. As soon as 
the linguistic game is constructed, the infant becomes a subject of the game, 
and the linguistic construction replaces the actual relation with the mother. 
Both the infant and the mother are defined as subjects by the Other, by the 
network of relations which connect them and determine them in language, 
the ordering of reality. Language assumes a primacy over perception, and the 
word becomes more important than the perceived object as the anchoring 
point of the subject in its conscious, imaginary experience as determined by 
its unconscious, symbolic order, the Other. 
      The unconscious was defined by Lacan in “The Function of Language in 
Psychoanalysis” as “that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is 
transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the 
continuity of his conscious discourse” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 49). As the 
subject becomes redefined to itself in relation to the Other, in the symbolic or 
unconscious, it loses its definition of itself in relation to itself in the imagi-
nary, its conscious reason, spoken language and perception. The absence of 
the subject in language is perpetually recreated in language, as in the Fort! 
Da! game of the infant, in which is inscribed the trace of the presence of the 
unconscious or symbolic, the “world of meaning of a particular language in 
which the world of things will come to be arranged” (p. 65). The archetypal 
form of Plato, for example, the construction of a metaphysical language, is 
the recreation of such a reality, the transposition of a language which is al-
ready inscribed with the deceptive totality of a system which insures being. 
As in the metaphysic, “through that which becomes embodied only by being 
the trace of a nothingness and whose support cannot thereafter be impaired, 
the concept, saving the duration of what passes by,” as in Zeno’s paradox, 
“engenders the thing.” The intelligible form determines the sensible form in 
perception; apperception and a priori intuition determine the manifold of 
perceived reality. 
      The Platonic archetypal form is the trace of a nothingness, the absence in 
perception as given by the construction of perception in reason, in the imagi-
nary order. “It is the world of words that creates the world of things,” for La-
can, as it was for Plato, Plotinus, Grosseteste, Ficino, Kant, Hegel, and 
Freud, in the concept, in the process of perception, and in the structuring of 
the unconscious as given by the dream. The thing is given by concept as an 
“everlasting possession” (Thucydides), as the archetype or intelligible, ac-
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cording to Lacan, thus the metaphysical structure of reason. “Man speaks, 
then, but it is because the symbol has made him man,” even prior to his birth. 
As the subject is both an absence in language and an always already presence 
in that absence, so the subject is an always already presence in history. As 
the subject is determined by language, so the subject is determined by histo-
ry. In Reason in History, Hegel defined the subject in history as an “antithe-
sis to the natural world” (III).19 History, like the subject, begins its purpose 
as the realization of spirit, being-in-itself (an sich), the unconscious. History 
is the process of making conscious the unconscious, the transition from sub-
jective to objective spirit.  
      Historical events are seen as mechanisms toward bringing the uncon-
scious to consciousness, in conscious reason; history is the stage on which 
are acted out the events of the constructed reality of mind in its self-
alienation from nature and from its other, the unconscious, in objective spirit. 
The individual will is seen as the product of a culture, as the particular is a 
product of the universal, the thing is a product of the word. The individual 
historical subject can only act in relation to its position in history and the 
Other: “The individual does not invent his own content; he is what he is by 
acting out the universal as his own content” (III.2.b), that is to say, the un-
conscious is the discourse of the Other. Any action which contributes to the 
course of the historical development of a culture on the part of an individual 
is a consequence of that individual interpreting and carrying out the universal 
will of the culture, the concept of the culture, in particular events.  
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This essay developed and rewritten from sections of Architecture and Psychoanaly-
sis, New York: Peter Lang, 2006, without the references to architecture, and with 
revisions and corrections. 
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